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EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Michael E. Zacharia,*
Michael A. Kvarme** and
Christopher Chediak***
I. INTRODUCTION
Any biotechnology company contemplating an international
transaction must consider the possible effect of the United States
export control laws administered under the Export Administration
Act' (the Act) or risk serious civil and criminal penalties. The Act
is pervasive and regulates any transaction involving U.S. origin
goods and technologies and covers both U.S. and foreign persons.
The United States controls exports for various purposes includ-
ing health and safety, national security concerns and foreign policy.
These export policies have already had a serious impact on some
segments of the biotechnology industry. For instance, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has required approval of new
pharmaceuticals prior to any export outside the United States2 and,
Copyright © 1987 Michael E. Zacharia, Michael A. Kvarme and Christopher Chediak. All
Rights Reserved.
* Partner, Weintraub Genshlea Hardy Erich & Brown, Sacramento, California; For-
mer Special Counsel to the Under Secretary for International Trade, United States Depart-
ment of Commerce; University of California, Berkeley (A.B. 1973); University of California
Hastings College of the Law (J.D. 1976).
** Partner, Weintraub Genshlea Hardy Erich & Brown, Sacramento, California. Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley (A.B. 1976); University of California, Davis (J.D. 1979).
*** Associate, Weintraub Genshlea Hardy Erich & Brown, Sacramento, California.
University of California, Davis (B.S. (genetics) 1980); University of Southern California (J.D.
1983).
1. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1979). Regulations promulgated under the Act are found at
15 C.F.R. § 368. There are other pertinent export controls administered by the Food and
Drug Administration, the State Department, other agencies, and under other laws which will
be mentioned only briefly. The other primary statutes under which export controls are main-
tained are the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751, and the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1-120.23 (1986). Enforcement under these provisions is
similar to that under the Act.
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (1938); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1986). A good discussion of
industry concerns in this regard may be found in B. Cunningham, Need for Statutory Change
in U.S. Drug Export Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administra-
tion, High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks - Biotechnology 25-27 (1984)
(hereinafter "Biotechnology Profile"). See also, Trewhitt and Spalding, The Biotech Industry
Lays Out a Legislative Agenda, 136 CHEM. ENG. NEws 18 (May 29, 1985).
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as a consequence, U.S. industry believes it has been placed at a dis-
advantage in selling such pharmaceuticals in countries where ap-
proval already exists. Generally, representatives of the U.S.
biotechnology industry have asserted that export controls are often
inconsistent, cumbersome and overly rigid, and that they unneces-
sarily hamper the ability of domestic companies to interact with for-
eign business partners and to supply foreign distributors or compete
on the international market.3 Representatives of the Department of
Defense (Defense) and others have contended that the existing ex-
port laws fail to control exports sufficiently to prevent the transfer
of militarily sensitive technologies which quickly become available
to unfriendly countries and jeopardize our national security.
U.S. export control laws already impose significant controls on
the transfer of biotechnology and its products and could soon im-
pose even more significant controls and restrictions. In 1985 the
Act was significantly revised and amended. In July of 1985, De-
fense issued a statement expressing its concern regarding the abuse
by the Soviet Union of genetically-altered bacteria for germ warfare
purposes in Afghanistan, and subsequently stated its concern that
export controls must be increased to avoid the release of U.S. tech-
nology involving genetic manipulation. Defense has prepared a
classified Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) which pro-
poses the imposition of numerous specific restrictions on the trans-
fer of biotechnology.
The conflict between the needs of free trade and international
cooperation versus the need for restrictions on the flow of militarily
or politically important goods or information creates a volatile and
uncertain situation for the U.S. exporter of biotechnology or related
products. The industry itself has crossed the threshold from tech-
nology development into product development4 that will make po-
licing the Act easier and increase public and regulatory concerns.
The Act and its implications can no longer be ignored.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
There are three basic types of controls under the Act. The first
are national security controls which restrict the export of goods and
technology that would make a significant contribution to the mili-
tary potential of any other country or combination of countries and
3. See Glick, Export Control of Biotechnology, Biotechnology Profile 16-19; Biotech
Regulation: DuPont Chief Urges Clearer Policy, 62 CHEM. ENG. NEWS 6 (Sept. 24, 1984).
4. See generally, Spellman, Small Firms Are Big in Biotech, 72 NATION'S BUSINESS 76-
78 (May 1984); Biotech Finally Goes to Market, 112 FORTUNE 8 (Nov. 25, 1985).
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could prove to be detrimental to the national security of the United
States.5 Computer technology, particularly hardware, has been reg-
ulated for this reason. The second type restricts the export of goods
and technology in the interest of furthering U.S. foreign policy
goals, e.g., the Soviet grain embargo or fulfilling U.S. international
obligations.6 The final type is a "short-supply" control which re-
stricts the export of goods necessary to protect the domestic econ-
omy from an excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the
inflationary impact of foreign demands.7 An example of this last
type of control is oil export restrictions imposed during an oil crisis.
The Department of Commerce (Commerce) is primarily re-
sponsible for administering and interpreting the Act and determin-
ing the levels of control to impose under it. The Departments of
State (State) and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are
also involved. Other agencies, such as the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) and the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture),
may also play important roles with respect to export controls in
particular areas.
The export controls under the Act are enforced by Commerce
and the U.S. Customs Service (Customs). Some time ago, to in-
crease compliance, Customs initiated "Operation Exodus." Under
that project, Customs regularly delayed or restricted exports of
goods with inadequate or faulty declarations. As discussed more
fully below, until recently the biotechnology industry has exported
technology which is far more difficult to detect and police than
goods.
In general, the Act regulates the export of all goods, technol-
ogy and technical data transferred by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. Various levels of control are im-
posed upon the export or release of technology and goods depend-
ing upon: (i) their specific nature, intended use and end user; and
(ii) either the category of the Commodity Control List (CCL)8 into
which the goods fall or, with respect to technology, the goods on
the control list to which the technology is related.
A. What is Covered?
The Act is very far-reaching. The definition given of "goods,"
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1979).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The list of commodities is under the export control jurisdiction of the Office of
Export Administration. See 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1986).
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"technology" and "export" are all expansive. Moreover, due to the
breadth of the definitions, the Act applies to various situations not
otherwise affected. Further, the distinction between goods and
technology is unclear and certain goods may be characterized both
as a commodity and as technology for the purposes of the Act.
1. Exports
The term "export," apart from its usual meaning, is defined to
include "the transfer to any person of goods or technology, either
within the United States or outside the United States, with the
knowledge or intent that the goods or technology will be shipped,
transferred, or transmitted to an unauthorized recipient." 9 With re-
spect to technical data, "export" includes: (i) any release of infor-
mation to foreign nationals by visual inspection of U.S. origin
equipment or facilities; (ii) oral exchanges of information in the
United States or abroad; and (iii) the application to situations
abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in
the United States. 10
As a result of the broad definition of exports, the export con-
trols apply extra-territorialy. The Act not only controls exports
from the United States, but the reexport of U.S. goods or technol-
ogy from any point in the world. Moreover, exports to a foreign
party with knowledge that a transfer to a third country will occur
constitutes two exports (an export and a reexport) subject to the
Act. Export controls have been extended to entirely non-U.S.
goods when they are exported from a foreign country on the
grounds that the foreign country exporter was controlled by a U.S.
person. "
It is often difficult to determine when an export subject to the
Act has occurred. Often, there will be significant interaction be-
tween the U.S. exporter and the foreign importer of biotechnology
or related products prior to the contemplated transfer. This inter-
action may take the form of negotiations, research progress reports,
inspection of facilities or personnel training regarding underlying
technology. The U.S. exporter must be aware that these prelimi-
nary interactions may themselves comprise an export of technology.
For example:
9. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(5)(c) (1986).
10. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)(2) (1986).
11. See, eg., Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982) (a
French company's export privileges were denied ex parte where reexports were being made to
the U.S.S.R. for use on the Siberian pipeline counter to U.S. provisions.)
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Situation 1
Negotiations begin between an emerging U.S. biotechnology
firm and an Australian business regarding the feasibility of a joint
research and development venture for the development of serum
which will contain a genetically-altered virus for use in the inocula-
tion of cattle against a prevalent disease. As part of the negotia-
tions, the U.S. firm sends initial research results and a description of
its research plans to the Australian company.
Situation 2
A U.S. business enters into an agreement with a Japanese com-
pany that once the U.S. firm has developed a new biotechnological
product the Japanese company will act as the distributor through-
out the Pacific Rim. The product development is still incomplete,
but as part of the agreement the Japanese partner sends two of its
junior scientists to the U.S. company for training.
Situation 3
A joint research and development program is begun between a
U.S. company and a French firm under which the U.S. company
will develop a genetically-modified bacterial strain which produces
a useful chemical by-product. Once the strain is produced the
French company will develop a fermentation method for the com-
mercial production of the chemical. The French company is to
fund part of the initial U.S. research. The project is in its early
stages and there have been no significant results from the U.S. com-
pany's research. In order to facilitate the appropriate development
of the bacteria, the U.S. company sends the non-modified bacterial
strain to France for review and comment.
In each of the above examples there has been an export subject
to control under the Act. If the appropriate licenses are not ob-
tained or available, there will have been a violation of the Act which
could subject all parties to penalties or restrictions on their export
privileges.
2. Goods and Technology
In essence, the definitions of goods and technology encompass
all tangible and intangible property that a company might export:
"Good" is defined as: any article, natural or man-made sub-
stance, material, supply or manufactured product, including in-
1987]
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spection and test equipment, and excluding data.12
"Technology" includes: the information and know-how
(whether in tangible form, such as models, prototypes, drawings,
sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or manuals, or in intangible form,
such as training or technical services) that can be used to design,
produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including
computer software and technical data, but not the goods
themselves. 13
The Office of Export Administration in the Department of
Commerce (OEA) has established the CCL that classifies all goods
under its jurisdiction. Technology is classified by reference to the
goods which it produces and to which it relates. The degree of reg-
ulation of goods and technology under the Act is determined by
reference to the CCL and proposed country of destination. Virtu-
ally all goods, and thus technology, are classified on the CCL.t4
B. What are the Penalties?
A major reason for concern regarding the future application of
U.S. export controls is the extreme enforcement powers established
under the Act. Failure to comply with the Act can result in stiff
civil and criminal penalties as well as denial orders restricting the
exporting privileges of the affected companies, domestic and for-
eign, both before and after formal charges are made.
1. Criminal and Civil Penalties
An exporter who "knowingly" violates or conspires to or at-
tempts to violate the Act, regulations, or any order or license issued
under the Act, may be punished by a criminal fine for each violation
of not more than the greater of five times the value of the exports
involved, or $50,000, and/or by imprisonment for up to five years. 15
An exporter found to have willfully violated or conspired to or at-
tempted to violate the Act, regulations, or any order or license is-
sued under the Act, with the knowledge that the exports will be
used for the benefit of a country to which exports are restricted for
national security or foreign policy purposes may be penalized. In
the case of an individual, the exporter may be fined up to $250,000
12. 50 U.S.C. § 2415(3) (1986).
13. 50 U.S.C. § 2415(4) (1986).
14. Exports not controlled by OEA include the transfer of certain defense articles, cer-
tain narcotic and non-narcotic substances, natural gas and electric power, tobacco seeds and
plants, endangered fish and wildlife and unclassified data in the form of patent applications.
15 C.F.R. § 370.10 (1986).
15. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (1979); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(1)(i) (1986).
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and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years. An exporter that is not an
individual, i.e., a corporation, may be fined up to five times the
value of the exports involved or $1,000,000, whichever is greater.16
Similar penalties are imposed on persons exporting under a
validated license who, with the knowledge that the export is being
used by a controlled country for military or intelligence gathering
purposes contrary to the license conditions, willfully fail to report
that use to the Secretary of Defense. Submitting false or misleading
information is also punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and/or
imprisonment for not more than five years for each violation.1" The
regulations also contain various other provisions identifying actions
in violation of the Act, including aiding or abetting and soliciting or
conspiring to act in violation of the Act.18
Severe administrative sanctions may be imposed in addition to
these criminal sanctions. The administrative sanctions include sus-
pension or revocation of any licenses held by the exporter, a general
denial of export privileges and/or a civil penalty of up to $10,000
for each violation, provided that this penalty is not to exceed
$100,000 if it involves solely national security controls.19
2. Temporary and General Denial Orders
A company or individual may temporarily lose exporting privi-
leges upon the issuance by Commerce or by the presiding official in
an administrative or judicial export enforcement proceeding of a
Temporary Denial Order (TDO).20 A TDO may be issued against
any person or company under investigation for violation of the Act
and can be issued without notice or due process protections in order
to prevent an imminent violation of the Act, regulations, order or
license. TDO's may be issued ex parte by Commerce in reliance on
secret advice. A TDO may also be issued by Commerce in a formal
"charging letter" against the exporter. Although TDO's are ini-
tially to be issued for a period not to exceed 60 days, in practice
their initial term may be longer.
Potentially the most severe of the administrative sanctions is
the General Denial Order (GDO). A GDO, which is essentially a
lengthened TDO, excludes an exporter from participating (i) di-
rectly or indirectly in any manner in transactions involving the ex-
16. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (1979); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(1)(ii) (1986).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1948); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(2) (1986).
18. See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1-387.13 (1986).
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1979); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b) (1986).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 388.19 (1986).
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port of technical data or commodities, or (ii) in the production
abroad of such data or commodities.21 The conduct precluded
under a GDO includes not only participation as a party or represen-
tative of a party with respect to exports but also participation in
preparing or filing export documents or participation in negotia-
tions with respect to "receiving, ordering, buying, selling, deliver-
ing, storing, using, or disposing of any commodities or technical
data."22
A GDO can be partial or complete and may be for any speci-
fied period of time. Significantly, an order may also be applicable to
persons related to the exporter such as affiliated corporations. 23
Either form of denial order can clearly have a devastating im-
pact upon the business dealings of a company engaged in interna-
tional trade and has in the past been used against well-established
international businesses. For instance, the U.S. utilized its export
control laws under a TDO to preclude European companies from
reexporting products to the U.S.S.R. for use on the Siberian pipeline
by denying export privileges to U.S. firms shipping parts abroad.24
Because of the severe sanction powers outlined above, it is im-
portant that exporters be aware of potential violations of the Act.
This is especially important with respect to the biotechnology area
because the rapid development of technology increases the possibil-
ity of ambiguity with respect to the proper classification of exports,
thus making compliance more difficult.
3. How Does the Export Administration Act Work?
The Act requires that an exporter of regulated goods or tech-
nology obtain a license prior to transfer abroad. The classification
of the particular good or technology on the CCL and its proposed
destination determines the required license. For both goods and
technology, there are two types of licenses available, general and
validated.
a. Destinations
The world is divided into a series of country groups for pur-
poses of determining the applicable export regulations.25 In es-
21. 15 C.F.R. § 388.3 (1986).
22. Id. § 388.3(a).
23. 15 C.F.R. § 388.3(c) (1986).
24. Cf., Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982) (denial
of injunctive relief to prevent Department of Commerce from imposing sanctions prohibiting
export of goods to U.S.S.R.).
25. 15 C.F.R. § 370 (Supp.1 1986).
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sence, the more closely aligned a country is with the United States,
the fewer the regulations that are applied. Thus, there are limited
prohibitions on exports to NATO countries and Japan unless there
will be subsequent reexport. Exports to Canada are extremely fa-
vored and only the most limited controls apply.26 At the other ex-
treme, exports are virtually prohibited if the destination is to a
"hostile" country such as Libya, Vietnam or Cuba. Although less
restricted, exports to the communist bloc countries are highly
regulated.
b. Licenses for Goods
A general license allows the export of goods or technology
without specific application to OEA and is essentially an exemption.
As of the date of this publication, there are approximately seventeen
forms of general licenses available for the export of goods.27 In the
shipment of biotechnology products, the G-DEST license is most
applicable.28 The G-DEST license is available for shipments where
a validated license is not required.29 In all cases, the exporter must
declare its reliance upon the specific general license upon export
either in writing or orally.30
There are two principal problems with reliance upon a general
license. First, the general license will be unavailable if the exporter
knows that there will be a reexport to a country in which a vali-
dated license is required. Second, the general license is self-issued
by the exporter and there is no governmental assurances that the
exporter is complying with the Act.
A validated license requires the exporter to receive specific ap-
proval by OEA prior to export. If a validated license is required the
exporter may, in some circumstances, avoid the necessity of re-
peated applications for similar exports if a form of multiple license
is available, most notably including the Project License, Distribu-
tion License and Comprehensive Operations License.3'
A Project License authorizes exports for a specific activity and
26. See, e-g., 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(c) (1986).
27. 15 C.F.R. § 371.3 - 371.22 (1986).
28. Id. § 371.3; accord 15 C.F.R. § 371.5 (1986) (a general license GLV is also available
for some shipments of limited dollar value); accord 15 C.F.R. § 371.13 (1986) (another li-
cense of potential application is the general license GUS for shipment to U.S. government
agencies abroad); 15 C.F.R. § 371.13 (1986). See generally Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp.
668 (D.D.C. 1978) (confronting the prevention of shipment of biological properties of poly-
oma DNA cloned in bacterial cells to Fort Detrick, Maryland).
29. 15 C.F.R. § 371.3 (1986).
30. 15 C.F.R. § 371.2 (1986).
31. 15 C.F.R. § 373.1-373.8 (1986).
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for a period of one year and may be extended for up to a total of
seven years for: (i) substantial capital expansion projects; (ii) main-
tenance, repair and supply programs regarding existing facilities;
and (iii) programs for supplying materials to be used in the produc-
tion of other commodities for sale. 32 A Distribution License autho-
rizes exports of certain goods by firms possessing "a thorough
knowledge of and experience with" the regulations to approved dis-
tributors or users.33 It requires the applicant to establish an inter-
nal control program designed to ensure compliance with the
regulations and license conditions. The Comprehensive Operations
License is a form of multiple license which authorizes the export
and reexport of technology and related goods, including items on
the MCTL, from a domestic company to and among its foreign sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, joint venturers and licensees that have long-term
contractually defined relations with the exporter. The exporter's
foreign associates must be approved by Commerce and may not be
in certain controlled countries. Further, the domestic company
must have established an approved internal control system to qual-
ify for this multiple license. The multiple licenses obviate the need
to apply separately for a license each time an export is made. Ac-
cordingly, every effort to obtain one of these licenses should be
made to minimize the burden of export control on company
operations.
OEA has made significant improvements in the time required
to process license applications. Roughly speaking, however, one
should plan on at least three to four weeks for the processing of a
noncontroversial free world export, six to eight weeks for the license
applications requiring interagency review, and four months for ap-
plications requiring review by the international security export con-
trol system Coordinating Committee (COCOM). There is an
emergency clearance procedure which can be requested and, if
granted, can shorten the time required for processing a license ap-
plication. The 1985 amendments imposed new, stringent time con-
straints on the processing of the license applications. OEA
estimates that its processing time has decreased by one-third as a
consequence.
c. Licenses for Technology
There are two forms of general licenses, GTDA and GTDR,
which may be relied upon for the transfer of technology. Three
32. 15 C.F.R. § 373.2(e) (1986).
33. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1986).
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types of technical data may be exported to any country under a
GTDA (technical data available to all destinations) general license:
(i) data generally available without restriction at a nominal cost,
such as publications or conferences; (ii) scientific or educational
data not directly and significantly related to industrial applications;
and (iii) data contained in foreign patent applications.34 If the ex-
porting company protects its information as trade secrets or if the
information has commercial value, these exceptions will not apply.
In practice, OEA strictly construes these public availability
exceptions.
The second form of general license for the export of technology
is the GTDR (technical data under restriction).35 The availability
of the GTDR general license depends on the country group to
which the technical data is to be exported. Further, a GTDR gen-
eral license generally requires that one of two forms of "written as-
surance" be obtained from the recipient limiting any subsequent
reexport of the acquired technology. A GTDR general license is
generally available for the export of technical data to countries fall-
ing within Group V which includes non-Communist Europe. A
GTDR general license is not available for the export of technology
to North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba or Libya and is severely
restricted with respect to the communist bloc countries.36
The regulations provide an exception to the availability of a
GTDR general license if the exporter has "knowledge" that the
34. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3(a) - (c) (1986).
35. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1986).
36. Id. § 379.4(b) Only the following may be transferred to Communist Bloc countries
under a GTDR general license: (i) "operation technical data"; (ii) "sales technical data"; and
(iii) software that is not itself explicitly controlled or related to a commodity controlled for
national security or nuclear non-proliferation reasons. Operation technical data is defined as
"explicit data in such forms as manuals, instruction sheets, blueprints or software," provided
they are: (a) sent as part of a transaction directly related to a commodity licensed for export
from the United States, or specifically authorized for reexport; (b) a single shipment sent no
later than one year following the shipment of the commodity to which the technical data are
related; (c) of a type delivered with the commodity in accordance with established business
practice; (d) necessary to the assembly, installation, maintenance, repair, or operation of the
commodity; and (e) not related to the production, manufacture, or construction of the com-
modity.
Sales technical data is defined as "data supporting a prospective or actual quotation, bid
or offer to sell, lease or otherwise supply any commodity, plant or technical data," provided
that: (a) the commodity, plant or technical data are not related to a commodity; (b) the
technical data are of a type customarily transmitted with a prospective or actual quotation,
bid or offer; and (c) the export will not disclose the detailed design, production, or manufac-
ture, or the means of reconstruction, of either the quoted item or its product. Similarly, a
quotation, bid, or offer for technical data or services must not disclose the detailed technical
process involved.
1987]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGYLAW JOURNAL
technology will be reexported "directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part" from the authorized destination country unless: (i) the data
could be exported directly to the country of ultimate destination
under a GTDA or GTDR general license and the conditions for the
use of such general license has been met; (ii) with respect to reex-
ports to various non-European countries including the communist
countries, the OEA has "specifically authorized" the export of a
commodity and the data are limited to "operation" or "sales" tech-
nical data or uncontrolled software; or (iii) the reexport is a
COCOM (European community) authorized reexport.37 A GTDR
general license is therefore not available for the export of any know-
how or technology if the U.S. exporter has reason to believe that the
technology will be reexported to a restricted country, for example, a
communist bloc country.
As stated above, the use of a GTDR general license generally
requires "written assurance" from the foreign importer either limit-
ing or prohibiting any subsequent reexport. The strictest form of
written assurance applies only to specific technology with military
implications, e.g., dopplar sonar navigation systems.3 1 In that situ-
ation, written assurance is required from the foreign importer that
neither the technical data nor its direct products will be reexported
to the communist bloc countries, Afghanistan, People's Republic of
China, Libya and certain other countries. If such written assurance
cannot be obtained, the reasons must be set forth in any validated
license application. 9
The general form of written assurance must specify that the
foreign importer will obtain authorization from the OEA prior to
reexporting to certain country groups. The number of such re-
stricted country groups depends upon: (i) the commodity groups in
the CCL to which the transfer of technology relates; and (ii) the
commodity groups within which the direct products of the technol-
ogy fall.
Unless a GTDR or GTDA general license is available, a vali-
dated license or multiple license must be obtained. Often it is un-
certain within which licensing classification a given export falls.
Current law provides a means for requesting an advisory opinion
from Commerce regarding proper classification. Such requests
must be answered within ten working days.40 An exporter may also
37. 15 C.F.R. § 379.8 (1986).
38. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f)(1) (1986).
39. Id. § 379.4(f)(1).
40. 50 U.S.C. § 2409(b)(2) (1982).
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request information regarding the applicability of the export license
requirements to particular transactions. These requests must be an-
swered within 30 working days." In practice, however, Commerce
will not give substantial assurances in its opinions. It is, therefore,
more efficient to apply for a license and have any questions as to
classification in that context. If there is any doubt whether or what
type of a license is required, one should counsel clients to file a li-
cense application rather than rely on one's own determination and
face the risk of subsequent sanctions during a period of time when
the political or administrative climate may have changed
dramatically.
Unlike licenses for goods, licenses for technology do not appear
to require a declaration upon shipping;42 however, the regulations
are not entirely clear in this regard. The transfer of technology is
often amorphous and difficult to regulate. For instance, if the trans-
fer will occur by telephone, to whom does one make the declara-
tion? Nevertheless, any company must document the general
license upon which it relies or maintain the validated license ob-
tained in order to protect itself under the Act.4 3
III. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY
With regard to exports of biotechnology products, Groups 7
and 9 on the CCL contain the applicable regulatory authority.
Group 7 includes chemicals, metal alloys, petroleum products, and
related materials. Chemical group commodities require a validated
license for export to the communist and highly restricted countries
(North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia and Libya). Exports can
be made to virtually all countries without a validated license for
commodities included in "Interpretation 24." Included in this cate-
gory are DNA, various enzymes, nucleotides, "prepared culture
media" and pharmaceutical products.'
Group 9, the so-called "Miscellaneous Category," imposes
controls on viruses and bacteria. Exports of the virus group com-
modities require a validated license for most destinations except
Canada and would include all viral cloning vectors. Specific excep-
41. 50 U.S.C. § 2409(d) (Supp. III 1985) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 2409(d) (1982)).
42. Compare 15 C.F.R. § 371.2(b)(1) (1986) (requiring declaration of all general
licenses) with 15 C.F.R. § 379.6(a)(1) (1986) (noting that retention of a validated license is
required but need not be presented).
43. Retention of a validated license, whether necessary for presentation to Customs or
not, is absolutely required. 15 C.F.R. § 379.6(a)(1) (1986).
44. 15 C.F.R. § 399.2 (Supp.l Interpretation 24) (1986).
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tions for exports from the bacterial group are set forth in Interpreta-
tion 28 (inactivated, attenuated and various listed organisms) but
otherwise also require a validated license for exports to most coun-
tries other than Canada.45 This category would include bacterial-
cloning factors such as the agribacterial system. Those goods com-
ing within the catch-all group or Interpretation 28 (bacteria and
protozoa) may be exported to all countries except those highly
restricted.46
While the categories set forth above seem simple at first blush,
often the licensing classification is a difficult one to make because
commodity categories are imprecise or outdated. Goods, such as
genetically-altered organisms, e.g., seeds, or chemicals may be char-
acterized solely as a commodity or may constitute both a commod-
ity and technology, depending upon the possibility that the goods
may be used to reveal technical data. If the goods are to be reex-
ported together with other know-how, OEA may scrutinize the
transfer closely to determine whether that combination can reveal
other technology. OEA now takes the position that many ostensi-
ble biotechnology "products" are "models" or "prototypes" and,
hence, fall within the technical data category.47 Technical data con-
trols are taking on increased importance in the commodity area due
to the rapid changes occurring in biotechnology and the difficulty in
classifying new developments within the CCL categories.
Agricultural products may be subject to partial exclusion from
the export controls pursuant to the "Agricultural Commodities" ex-
ception to the Act as amended. Section 4(q) of the Act provides
that no controls for the purpose of national security may be applied
to Agricultural Commodities. Nonetheless, Agricultural Commod-
ities may be controlled for the purpose of foreign policy controls
which narrows the exception. Foreign policy controls are permissi-
ble except with respect to "donations of goods.., that are intended
to meet basic human needs." 48
45. 15 C.F.R. § 399.2 (Supp.1 Interpretation 28) (1986).
46. Interpretation 28 provides for lesser export controls with respect to certain industri-
ally significant bacteria such as Streptomycetaceae family bacteria and inactivated or attenu-
ated organisms. Commonly used bacteria such as the genera Escherichia, Bacillus and
Psuedomonas do not fall within Interpretation 28 and require a validated license for export to
all countries except Canada. Interpretation 28 provides a major exemption for biotechnology
products but must be formally amended to place new commercially important (and
nonpathogenic) microorganisms on the list.
47. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a)(note 3) (1986).
48. The Act requires that "before export controls on food are imposed, expanded or
extended under this Section, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall notify the Secretary of State
in the case of export controls applicable with respect to any developed country and shall
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The applicability of the agricultural exclusions appear limited
with respect to genetically-altered plants or seeds which, if they fall
under the catch-all category of ECCN 6999G, are controlled for
foreign policy purposes. The exclusion may be significant, however,
with respect to any national security controls. Such proposed con-
trols of agricultural products may be subject to attack because of
the agricultural exclusion provision. Nonetheless, the goods or
technology might still be controlled for foreign policy purposes and
thus avoid the agricultural exclusion.
The transfer of technology or know-how, whether it is for the
training of personnel, written reports, field supervision abroad or
the actual release of technology, falls within the controls of Section
379 (the Tech Data Regulations). As discussed above, the export of
technical data specifically includes its transfer through visual in-
spection, oral exchanges and the application abroad of "personal
knowledge" or "technical experience" acquired in the United
,States. There are clearly numerous applications of the Tech Data
Regulations which, although not now actively enforced, could cause
serious repercussions throughout the biotechnology industry. Thus,
the question for many exporters is whether they have a commodity
that may be transferred with a G-DEST license or technology that
may be transferred by means of a general license but requires writ-
ten assurances from the recipient. For instance, many U.S. compa-
nies have research contracts with foreign companies in which the
end product of the research is the isolation or development of a gene
which confers a desired trait upon an organism. What license is
required? Currently, it would appear that the gene is technology
and thus regulated under the Tech Data Regulations. If the gene is
contained in seed, the agricultural exclusion would seemingly apply
to the export of the good. Again, however, Commerce may take the
position, particularly with the first batch, that the seeds are technol-
ogy and subject to more stringent regulations. In a similar context,
an exporter may wish to ship a gene to Japan. Depending on
whether the gene is transferred by itself, in a plasmid, in bacteria or
within a genetically altered organism, the Act imposes different
levels of regulations.
The Tech Data Regulations have grown increasingly important
to the biotechnology industry, as noted above, due to the OEA posi-
tion that many biotechnology commodities are also models or pro-
notify the Director of the United States International Development Cooperation Agency."
50 U.S.C. § 2405(g) (Supp. III 1985) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 2450(g) (1982)).
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totypes which would fall under the Tech Data Regulations. 49
The application of the Act to biotechnology is generally new.
Further, the biotechnology industry is in an explosive stage with
new developments and insights constantly occurring. Conse-
quently, a biotechnology exporter is faced with significant uncer-
tainty as to whether its technology or products are covered and if so
to what extent.
To compound the uncertainty an exporter faces, OEA is rela-
tively new to the regulation of biotechnology and has not built up
significant expertise in a technological sense. Uncertainty continues
as to the potential long-term impact of developments. Conse-
quently, an exporter should analyze its technology or product thor-
oughly, project the potential negative repercussions and prepare
appropriate responses for the regulators in advance of any license
application.
A. Practical Suggestions
Due to the lack of established precedent regarding biotechnol-
ogy and the relative inexperience of governmental officials adminis-
trating the Act, it is difficult for an exporter to determine precisely,
ahead of time, what restrictions OEA will place upon a particular
transfer of biotechnology products or upon the technology itself. It
is highly unlikely that technology may be legally exported without a
validated license unless a sufficient form of written assurance is first
obtained from the foreign importer. Furthermore, the reexport to
restricted country groups of any technology is precluded. Exports
of microorganisms and viruses will often require a validated license.
Also, until sufficient precedent is established regarding the technol-
ogy in this area, U.S. exporters should consider submitting an appli-
cation for a validated license with respect to questionable exports.
If Commerce returns the license application "without action" based
on the availability of a general license, the company should be pro-
tected from future enforcement proceedings.
The key to minimizing the delay and frustration in obtaining
an OEA license determination is thorough and complete prepara-
tion of the necessary license application documents. Commerce of-
ficials are generally very helpful in giving informal advice on
preparing the necessary documents. Because many of the issues re-
volve around the technical scientific description of the export, attor-
neys should work closely with in-house technical specialists in
49. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a)(note 3) (1986).
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completing the license application and answering any questions
from the license officer. All license information communicated to
Commerce in confidence is kept in confidence and is not subject to
general disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.5
In general, the U.S. export controls are much more restrictive
than those of other countries although many other countries have
strict import regulations." Moreover, the export controls often are
not well understood outside the United States (or even within the
United States for that matter). Foreign joint venture partners or
customers should be made aware early on of the necessity for com-
pliance with U.S. export control laws. This will minimize the
chances of later misunderstandings if there are delays or complica-
tions in obtaining any necessary license approval. It is also useful to
include routinely in licensing agreements or written contracts with
the foreign entity a provision which satisfies the applicable "written
assurance" requirement under the regulations.
Exporters should remain aware that U.S. export controls apply
not only to the original export but also to any reexport of U.S. ori-
gin goods or technology. Exports made under a general license may
not be relied upon if the exporter has reason to believe that the
foreign importer will reexport to countries to which the exporter
could not have exported directly under the general license. Con-
tractual provisions should be included to protect U.S. exporters
with respect to such reexports and care taken to make certain that
goods are not exported under a general license to any countries to
which a validated license may be required. If both the commodity
and technology controls are applicable, the stricter requirements
will govern. 2
Finally, companies should assign compliance functions to a
person with the authority to ensure compliance. The Act combines
legal and technical requirements that require a good working rela-
tionship between the company's scientists and attorneys. The com-
pany's attorney should not only provide interpretation of the Act
but anticipate the regulator's concerns.
50. 50 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1982).
51. For a general discussion of applicable restrictions, see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANAL-
Ysis 461-467 (1984).
52. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a)(note 3) (1986).
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IV. WHAT DoEs THE FUTURE HOLD?
The era of regulation, in all its facets, has arrived for biotech-
nology exporting.
A. Influences on Regulatory Policy
Until recently, the worldwide biotechnology industry has de-
veloped primarily technology rather than products. Now compa-
nies are not only producing derivatives of genetically-altered
organisms, e.g., interferon and insulin, but the Department of Agri-
culture recently granted Biologics Corporation the first license to
market a genetically-altered virus in its Omnivac-PRV product.5 3
No longer is biotechnology an industry of promise and potential; it
is an industry on the verge of major product development. As a
consequence, many of the debates that have existed regarding the
political, legal, economic and ethical implications of genetic manip-
ulation will be focused in the near future on very real situations.
Regardless of the appropriateness of the concerns, the fact re-
mains that the public and regulators are highly cautious in dealing
with the burgeoning field of biotechnology.54 Evidence of this con-
cern is presented by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
reaction to Advance Genetic Sciences, Inc.'s unauthorized release
of its genetically-altered bacteria, Frostban, into the environment.
EPA imposed the maximum potential fine.
Export controls are only one facet of the regulatory environ-
ment applicable to biotechnology. Nevertheless, the same social
and political factors that affect the general regulation of biotechnol-
ogy will affect the future decisions regarding export control. 55 The
debate regarding the regulatory future for biotechnology has fo-
53. This license was at least temporarily withdrawn shortly after its issuance due to
public concern that Agriculture had failed to follow federal guidelines for the release of live
genetically altered organisms and neglected to conduct a proper environmental assessment of
the risks involved.
54. See Biotechnology Gets Good Marks in Survey, 63 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEws
16 (August 26, 1985). A recent survey of scientific, environmental and religious leaders
showed that the major concern of all groups was the potential for genetically-engineered
organisms to escape into the environment and cause serious environmental damage. As a
rule, leaders in all three groups believe that the benefits of a recombinant DNA research
outweighed the risks involved. But in a Yankelovich, Skelly and White survey, two-thirds of
those sampled believed that society should exercise caution in proceeding with genetic engi-
neering and almost one-third expressed concern that genetic engineering may produce more
harm than benefit. Public Says Genetic Engineers Should Proceed Cautiously, 1(8) BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 645 (Oct. 1983). See also F. Lyman, Genes and Greens - There Ought to be a Law
Before We Unleash the Products of Biotechnology on the World, 16 ENv. ACTION 10-11
(March/April 1985).
55. For discussion on these issues, see 62 CHEM. ENG. NEWS (Aug. 13, 1984).
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cused on many issues but principally on the economic, scientific and
political impacts.
The principal economic concern has been whether U.S. compa-
nies are disadvantaged by export control or other regulation. The
classic example is the stringent export regulations the FDA has im-
posed on drugs not yet approved by the FDA.56 Conversely, the
question is to what extent U.S. regulations can be used to counter-
act foreign regulations that negatively impact U.S. companies' com-
petitive positions abroad.
Export restrictions have been suggested to prevent U.S. bio-
technology companies from giving away our leading-edge technol-
ogy. 7 United States biotechnology companies have been very
successful in raising capital from entering into joint ventures with,
and selling to, international industrial concerns. 8 The general con-
cern is that these arrangements provide short-term economic gains
to our emerging industry but a long-term loss or obsolescence. For
instance, there has been speculation that Japanese companies will
soon overcome their disadvantage in recombinant DNA technology
due to the training Japanese researchers are receiving in the labora-
tories of their U.S. partners. 9
Industry's response to concerns regarding the export of tech-
nology has been that, while the United States has a leading edge in
recombinant DNA, Japan and Europe lead in immunology and
bioprocess functions which are often necessary for commercializa-
56. See B. Cunningham, Need for Statutory Change in U.S. Drug Export Policy,
PROFILES - BIOTECHNOLOGY 25 (1984).
57. For discussion of these issues, see Glick, Export Control of Biotechnology U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, BIOTECHNOLOGY PROFILES 16 (1984). As Mr. Glick has noted, "A
Washington Post series last spring headlined technology transfer issues with statements such
as "U.S. Sells Crown Jewels' of Knowledge" and "Made in America, Sold in Japan." These
and similar articles imply that U.S. business ultimately suffers from trade in high technology
products and services and that foreign competitors take the best of our technology and offer
little in return. That perspective reflects many voices of concern for the potential of compro-
mising America's current technological advantages. Yet many would argue that there are
significant rewards to U.S. business and, indeed, to the U.S. economy and society from an
open climate for trade in high technology business. Further, state-of-the-art skills quickly
advance into obsolescence. As a result, the most successful companies in any high technology
industry must profit from scientific and economic cooperation on an international scale.
58. See for example, Table 18 Id., which sets forth those public agreements between the
U.S. and non-U.S. biotechnology firms; table 19, Id., setting forth those public foreign invest-
ments in U.S. biotechnology firms. In addition, there are undoubtedly numerous invest-
ments, joint ventures and contracts which the parties have not announced or made public.
See also, How to Keep U.S. Biotech No. 1, 135 CHEM. WEEK 13 (October 31, 1984).
59. See How to Keep US. Biotech No. 1, 135 CHEM. WEEK 13-14 (October 31, 1984).
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tion of the results of recombinant DNA technology.6" Even the So-
viet Union, while behind in other areas, probably leads the world in
single-cell protein development.61 Thus, from the global economic
prospective that many argue, international interaction is required,
and those restricted in interaction will fall behind. Moreover, in-
dustry argues that current regulations are often responsible for the
restriction of U.S. commercial development in foreign markets.
Again, the most frequent example is that U.S. companies have been
prohibited from exporting a new drug until the FDA has approved
it, even if the proposed market is one in which regulatory approval
exists. 62
The second area in which concern has been focused has been
the scientific implications of biotechnology.63 While principally a
question impacting on domestic regulation, these issues may influ-
ence decisions on export control.64
The environmental perspective cites the deleterious effects
from the introduction of exotics such as starlings, gypsy moths,
chestnut blight, citrus cander and Dutch elm disease into new envi-
ronments as a reason for concern and increased regulation. Bio-
technology proponents note that genetic engineering is more
controlled and specific than its natural selection counterpart.65
60. See Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial Biotechnology and International
Analysis, 470 (1984).
61. R. Rhein, P. Dwyer, P. and D. Hunter, Biotech's Export Watch List', 137 CHEMI-
CAL WEEK 11 (July 24, 1985).
62. See, B. Cunningham, Need for Statutory Change in US. Drug Export Policy,
PROFILES - BIOTECHNOLOGY 25-27 (1984).
63. The principal area of environmental concern in the past has been focused on impli-
cations of the Environmental Impact Statement "EIS" requirement under the National Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4346 (1970). As a practical matter, the EIS is
something of a paper tiger. It is not a judgmental forum, but rather a requirement that costs
and benefits be analyzed by the prospective company. In the one case addressing this issue,
while the EIS caused delays for the company involved, the EIS was eventually determined to
be satisfactory. Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1978). Industry personnel have
also commented that the use of an EIS to regulate basic biotechnology research would be
severely chilling for United State's industry. See comments of Roger Salquist, President of
Calgene, Inc., in Genetic Engineering Report, 62 CHEM. ENG. NEWS 24 (August 13, 1984).
See also, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Aff'd.
District Court requirement that the National Institute of Health (NIH) make further analysis
under NEPA of the effects of genetic engineering, but vacated a requirement that specific
projects be examined in more detail).
64. A good many skeptics remain in academia, Congress and public interest organiza-
tions respecting the long-term effects of releasing genetically-altered organisms into the envi-
ronment. Biotechnology: How Tight Must Our Control Be? Conservation Foundation Letter
4 (May/June 1985).
65. See D. Hanson, Government, Industry Officials Discuss Biotechnology Public Policy,
62 CHEM. & ENG. NEws 21 (Feb. 4, 1985). See also K. Keller, 8 NIH Recombinant DNA
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Nevertheless, it is not possible to predict absolutely the long-term
effects of genetic modification. Consequently, other agencies or
laws could be employed at some point in the future to restrict ex-
ports on scientific or environmental grounds. A more likely occur-
rence is that imports will be restricted. As a result, foreign
countries could retaliate and ban U.S. exports.
The political influences on export control are ever changing
and are one of the underpinnings of the Act.66 The defense, foreign
policy, and short supply purposes of the Act will continue to have
the prominent influence on export regulation.
B. Probable Developments
The export of technology is amorphous and difficult to regu-
late. As noted, technology has been the major product of the bio-
technology industry to date. Technology may be transferred by any
form of communication including visits, telephone conversations or
mail, and governmental inspection of these communications is not
only difficult but could run counter to U.S. privacy and free speech
values. Consequently, for practical reasons, there has not been sub-
stantial prosecution of biotechnology companies for violation of the
Act. By contrast, goods must be physically transferred through
means that are currently regulated and allow for visual inspection.
Moreover, the Act's licensing provisions require an identification of
the license claimed on the product's package.
As products are developed for transfer, the ability to review a
company's actions increases dramatically. If a violation is found,
the probability of finding prior violations also increases. Thus, ab-
sent a change in law or approach to export control compliance by
biotechnology companies, there could soon be a dramatic increase
in enforcement under the Act. Further, the implementation of the
new MCTL will, in all probability, increase the restrictions on bio-
technology. Physical transfers abroad will further direct the atten-
tion of governmental officials to this area.
Because of the competing political issues involved in the appli-
cation of export controls and the rapid changes in biotechnology
Technical Bulletin No. 4; Testimony by R. Goodman before House Committee on Science
and Technology. Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight (Dec. 4, 1985).
66. The preamble to the 1985 amendment, for instance, cites the action of the Soviet
Union shooting down a civilian Korean jetliner as one of the reasons for more stringent
controls. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(15) (1985). ("It is the policy of the United States, particu-
larly in light of the Soviet massacre of innocent men, women and children aboard Korean Air
Lines Flight 7, to continue to object to exceptions of the International Control list for the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, subject to periodic review by the President.")
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and related products, it is likely that there will continue to be
changes in the degree of export controls affecting both U.S. export-
ers and foreign importers. To date, the presence of U.S. export con-
trols has not diminished the availability or amount of foreign trade
or joint ventures for U.S. biotechnology firms. Recently, however,
concern seems to be increasing abroad regarding the ability of U.S.
firms to interact internationally.67 Thus, industry will require
greater certainty and precision in the Act's applications.
A new MCTL is being considered by Defense. 68 The view ad-
vanced by Defense is often publicly appealing in a cold war environ-
ment. Public misunderstanding regarding the implications of
advanced technologies such as genetic engineering could lead to
stricter export controls.
In a global economic and scientific context such limitations
could have a serious negative impact on U.S. industry aside from
the effects of sanctions on specific companies. As stated above,
while the United States is clearly a leader in recombinant DNA
technology, it lags behind Europe and Japan in fermentation and
cell tissue technology. Thus, limiting U.S. exports of leading edge
recombinant DNA technology will probably lead to foreign firms or
countries restricting the release of bioprocess technology necessary
for scaling up and commercializing the results of recombinant
DNA.
As the biotechnology industry moves beyond the threshold of
introducing genetically-altered organisms into the environment, the
threat of environmental problems will become of greater public con-
cern. The General Accounting Office, for instance, has criticized
the Department of Agriculture's regulatory review process in this
regard. Increased regulation may well lead to export restrictions
such as those the FDA imposes upon unapproved drugs. More-
over, concerns in this area argue for the limitation of imports into
the United States. Thus, a U.S. company could find that it cannot
transfer technology from a foreign joint venturer. The environmen-
67. In the author's experience, pressure to comply with the Act now frequently comes
from foreign partners of U.S. companies. The foreign partner is concerned about the possibil-
ity of having all import privileges denied. Moreover, the foreign partner looks to its U.S.
partner to comply with a law in which its advisors frequently have little or no expertise.
68. Rhein, A New Biotech Concern: Exports to Hostile Nations, 92 CHEM. ENG. 18, 31
(Sept. 2, 1985). The MCTL contains two sections related to biotechnology: 16.7 (detection
and protective equipment technology) and 16.8 (technology for manufacture and dissemina-
tion of biological and toxin materials). Defense has identified four additional items of key-
stone equipment that it is proposing to add to section 16.8 of the MCTL. These are protein
and peptide sequencers, peptide and DNA synthesizers, oligonucleotide sequencers, and
amino acid analyzers.
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tal concern does not depend on the country of origin but the tech-
nology or product. Consequently, seemingly safe transactions such
as exchanges with Europe and Japan could be affected. In this area
in particular, the responsibility of the biotechnology industry and
the degree to which it exercises good judgment will play a major
role in the development of future policies.
An area which is related to export controls and which impacts
international transactions is regulations on imports abroad. To
date, the principal concern of U.S. companies has been the U.S. reg-
ulatory climate and its effects on the new industry. Foreign coun-
tries have welcomed U.S. companies' joint ventures and sales of
technology. As U.S. companies seek to market or produce products
abroad, they will encounter the severe restrictions imposed by many
countries against U.S. companies doing business abroad. Conse-
quently, the biotechnology industry, will begin new lobbying efforts
directed at encouraging the United States government to equalize
the ability to do business in the worldwide economy.
C. Suggestions for Dealing With the Regulatory Future
United States companies involved or contemplating involve-
ment in the international commercial exploitation of biotechnology
must work with the public and government in developing and com-
plying with an export regulation scheme which controls the export
of militarily significant technologies and provides environmental
safeguards while promoting the continued success in commercially
developing this field. The controls implemented must recognize the
need for international cooperation and the public availability of the
basic technology in the scientific educational community. Firms
must recognize and deal with the potential for serious governmental
intervention in international business ventures through the export
laws and the serious impact the Act could have on biotechnology
companies and the industry if they ignore these controls.
The comments of Edward G. Jefferson, chairman of Dupont,
are particularly telling in this regard: "We in industry, must be
prepared to take an early and clear position in favor of working
closely with government on these matters. [Industry, Government
and the Universities] have a responsibility with the public to get it
right the first time in biotechnology."69
Biotech firms can help shape the regulatory process by taking
69. Biotech Regulations: DuPont Chief Urges Clearer Policy, 62 CHEM. ENG. NEWS
6,7 (Sept. 24, 1984).
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an active role in its future. First, firms should analyze and docu-
ment the potential security aspects of any products and technology
under development. Any useful information in this regard should
be communicated to BIOTAC, whose task is to develop U.S. export
policies in the biotech field. Second, U.S. companies should develop
organizational vehicles through which the concerns of the industry
can be expressed in Washington. Third, every firm which is in-
volved in international trade should stay up to date on the latest
developments in the export controls debate. Finally, firms should
be aware of the Act and comply with it so that neither they nor
their partners can be an excuse for increased regulation.
The degree of regulation of biotechnology exports is unclear
and evolving. What is clear is that the Act currently provides for
extensive regulation and that such regulation will continue. Each
company involved in commercial development of biotechnology
must consider the impact of the Act and keep abreast of changes in
the regulatory climate.
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